吃什么能软化血管

Winnie the Pooh. Like butter wouldn’t melt in his mouth.

Banned in China! Chinese Politics

Uncensored

Hu Jintao Kuomintang Deng Xiaoping One-child policy Chiang Kai-shek Zhonghua minzu Mao Zedong Uyghur genocide v - t - e

“”The Chinese people have no recourse to anything like an independent judiciary. The Communist Party decides if you’re guilty or innocent. The conviction rate stands in excess of 98 per cent. Torture and forced confessions are commonplace. Xi has lately embarked on a vicious campaign of harassment and intimidation of workers’ rights activists, ethnic and religious minorities, and feminists. Scores of human rights lawyers have been rounded up and jailed.

—Terry Glavin, MacLean's

百度 这项举措是在效仿美国，后者自20世纪70年代的阿拉伯石油禁运之后一直保持着全球最大的战略石油储备，在墨西哥湾沿岸巨大的盐穴中储存了亿桶原油。

Xi Jinping (习近平) (1953–) has been the paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China since late 2012, replacing Hu Jintao. To give you an idea of the magnitude of his authority, Xi is the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — the head of the party and de facto leader, President of the People's Republic (de jure head of state) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (commander-in-chief of armed forces), making him the most powerful man in China since Chairman Mao Zedong. He has also managed to abolish term limits, effectively making him paramount leader for life. Xi has racked up a list of 12 separate leadership titles as of 2021. All of this has given rise to a personality cult that could possibly rival the cult of Mao (being the most powerful man and longest serving leader in China since Mao).

Xi Jinping is sometimes nicknamed "Winnie the Pooh" or "Xinnie the Pooh", after images comparing him to the oddly pantsless bear were censored on Chinese social media.

Early career

Born the son of an important revolutionary leader, Xi is a "Princeling", an opportunistic Chinese politician who rose through the ranks by riding on the coattails of his father. He quickly became Vice President under his predecessor, touring the world to maintain the appearance of diplomacy. Though called a Princeling, both his father and he himself suffered during the Cultural Revolution.

Something of a recluse, Xi burst out into the Chinese public almost at random, largely preferring to work behind the scenes, apart from a few token speeches and overseas meetings. His ascension to paramount leader was based on a last-minute compromise between party factions, as he was thought to be the one most likely to uphold the interests of the party while calming inter-party tensions.

Upon assuming power, he's called for a renewed campaign against political corruption, even creating a video game where players can zap corrupt politicians, continued assertion of Chinese hegemony and comprehensive national renewal at a time where Chinese society is unsure of its future despite being the most productive and successful in decades.

More like Mao?

Xi's priority is to guarantee the ruling position of the party, but unlike his predecessor, he is far more hands-on (and more clearly autocratic) in his attempt to unify the party and sustain support for the government. His first initiative was to promote a "thorough cleanup" of the party (consolidation of power), cracking down on the noisier members who had undercut the party's popularity. To restore faith and trust in the government, he's spearheading a campaign meant to reconnect with the public via grassroots and the "Chinese Dream" (see below). He's called for the rest of the government to "purify" themselves of greed, extravagance, laziness and hedonism by… taking baths.

His hard-on for Mao manifests in how he's suppressing any overt criticism of the man, from turning once-activist schools into propaganda outlets to calling for the party to promote and adhere to Maoism. National newspapers picture Xi as a "low-profile, amiable and practical" man who knows how the people act, and what they want and think, because he happened to eat steamed buns with ordinary folk when he worked as a local-level party secretary in Hebei province in the early 1980s. He also said that he used old clothes to patch his worn mattress. This casts Xi as both a follower and a successor to Mao, in the sense that he wants to be seen as a man connected with the public.

The irony is that Jinping is the son of Xi Zhongxun, who was imprisoned under Mao. Rehabilitated under Deng Xiaoping, Zhongxun helped champion the economic liberalization that began in southern China in 1979, but he was sidelined again after he was thought to have opposed the use of force to break up the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. Jinping himself also suffered directly during the Cultural Revolution: his education was summarily terminated at age 15, he was sent to the countryside during the Down to the Countryside Movement, he was arrested for desertion from his post, and then sentenced to dig ditches. Rather than learn the lessons of the evils of totalitarianism like his father apparently did, Jinping apparently took notes on how to consolidate power and run an autocracy.

Document Number 9

In the summer of 2013, a confidential internal document circulated throughout the CCP listed six "dangerous" Western values (although general coverage is not allowed): Western constitutional democracy, pro-market neoliberalism, universal values of human rights, media independence, civil society, and "nihilist" criticisms of past errors of the party. The document was leaked by the public newspaper of the Liaoyuan municipal government. Without doubt, this was meant to forestall opposition to needed economic reforms, so as to avoid the split which resulted in the Soviet Union during Gorbachev's reform efforts.

The fact that this needed to be circulated should tell you something about the current state of China.

Power is paramount

His anti-corruption campaign, if you hadn't already figured it out, targets primarily (if not exclusively) anyone he feels is a threat to his power. The reason he is the most powerful in China since Deng Xiaoping can be traced directly to his pseudo-Cultural Revolution (except in this case, it's directed within the party and no annihilation of culture).

As a brief summary of the power struggle, you have two major factions within the CCP, one led by Jiang Zemin (known as the Shanghai Clique) and the other led by Hu Jintao (known as the Beijing Clique). The differences come not from any substantial policy differences, mind you, but from those who are seen as relatively more populist (Hu Jintao) and considerably more elitist (Jiang Zemin). Jiang first rose to prominence by advocating for a crackdown on a student protest in Tianamen Square, and he gained considerable power through his persecution of Falun Gong; for the sake of so-called national defense, he consolidated his power within the party by stacking the Politburo Standing Committee with his men and creating the 610 Office (which directs the security forces). Even when Hu was officially the leader of China, Jiang and his clique retained more influence; Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao had next to no power. Hu's clique disapproved of the idea of executing a very expensive crackdown on 100 million Chinese citizens who followed the Falun Gong exercises, let alone the teachings of the movement, which split the party between those two factions.

Xi Jinping was chosen as a compromise leader, as a way for the party to "clean" themselves of their differences. Xi responded by cracking down on all associates, corporate giants, government bureaucracies, and various other associates of Jiang Zemin, which consequently marginalized Hu Jintao's clique while empowering those who happen to grab Xi's coat tails. The most notable bureaucrats hit with anti-corruption charges are former Commerce Minister Bo Xilai, once a rising star in the party who got his start by shutting Falun Gong and other political prisoners into prison camps without due process. Falun Gong practitioners kept bringing lawsuits against Bo as a result of his mistreatment of them, leading to Hu and Wen finding Bo to be too much of a liability to become Vice Premier. His police chief was Wang Lijun, who allegedly took part in live organ harvesting of several thousand prisoners and wiretapped Hu's phone calls. Wang, fearing for his life at the impending purge, fled to the United States.

The highest ranking official purged by Xi's crusade was Zhou Yongkang, the fourth most powerful man in China under Jiang and Hu. His security apparatus, which included paramilitary police and secret police, had a bigger budget and more manpower than the army. Just like Bo and Jiang, Zhou partly owes his success to persecuting Falun Gong, and he is rumored to have murdered his first wife in order to marry Jiang's niece. He was hand-selected by Jiang to chair the Ministry of Public Security, joined the Politburo Standing Committee, and controlled the entire legal system plus the 610 Office. He was also seen as the man behind Kim Jong-un in North Korea; he was the only foreigner on the stadium behind Kim and the other North Korean generals in addition to being Kim's godfather.^{[citation needed]}

Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang were the two most powerful and well-known associates of Jiang Zemin. Bo and Zhou heavily expanded the labor camp system, as well as the organ harvesting of live prisoners.^{[citation needed]} Bo and Zhou are rumored to have planned two coup attempts on Xi Jinping. As you'd expect, both were purged, with Bo receiving a life sentence for corruption and abuse of power. Meanwhile, Xi reduced the power of Zhou's former position, ended the labor camp system expanded by Zhou, investigated Zhou's crooked cronies in the oil industry, evicted Zhou from the party, and set up an official trial for the former security czar. That went quite well, right? Well, not really, because the corruption charges do not mention how they came into power, because that would make the Party look bad, and both men serve as convenient scapegoats to placate the concerns of the Chinese public over the party while empowering Xi's own reputation. Don't hold your breath for allowing Falun Gong to practice their beliefs either, because the Party never makes mistakes.

Even the ever-opportunistic Western companies are being hit. Along others, Microsoft, JP Morgan Chase, GlaxoSmithKline, General Motors, Volkswagen Audi, and through subsidiaries, Mercedes-Benz, were hit with anti-monopoly charges including pricing violations and market dominance. This is particularly interesting, because it perfectly shows the mindset of Xi Jinping. These anti-monopoly charges help control prices in politically sensitive industries and empower domestic Chinese firms in order to use these regulatory tools that are common in other countries to control markets to their advantage in China.

This is how it helps the Party, but how does it help Xi Jinping? Many of these foreign companies had close ties to — wait for it — Jiang Zemin, when he was himself the leader of China in the 1990s. Jiang himself first rose up the ladder in the state-owned First Auto Works Group; a grand total of fifty executives have been investigated under Xi. Jiang's son chaired the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation, which has joint ventures with General Motors, Volkswagen Audi, and Mercedes-Benz. Zhou Yongkang, Jiang's top ally, chaired the state-run Petroleum Corporation which used Microsoft's email service exclusively before being switched to a more domestic (read: party-approved) one in 2014. Jiang's son even got into Microsoft, as the owner of 50% of MSM China's website through his Shanghai Alliance Investment company. Bill Gates' venture into China was largely due to Jiang Zemin wanting it, and currently, Xi wants none of that while he remains paramount leader.

Even the departments in charge of the anti-monopoly campaign are being targeted. The Ministry of Commerce, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, and National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) are the three agencies responsible for the investigations of foreign companies who made pals with Jiang. The Ministry of Commerce and NDRC were once the guardians of the wealth of Jiang's faction under so-called "financial gatekeeper" Liu Tienan (sentenced to life in prison for bribery); both agencies were purged just before the anti-monopoly campaign began. The Party abolished presidential term limits, which effectively made Xi ruler for life.

Authoritarian social policies

By late 2021, Xi Jinping decided to crack down on any scintilla of a percent of resistance to his rule. Touting his "national rejuvenation" policy, Xi's government took multiple new steps to crack down on cultural, business, and social mores, first by cracking down on video game usage. He restricted children (described as anyone under 18) from playing video games, except on Fridays, weekends, and holidays, and only for one hour, and only from 8pm to 9pm local time on those days. While the idea is to combat "youth video game addiction," this is a form of social engineering that removes even basic pleasures for younger Chinese, while completely disregarding streamers who play games for a career. This was done after reports showed children were using adult IDs to circumvent previous restrictions on video game usage. In truth, this is mainly a way for Xi to stop people from bypassing his government's overall internet and social media restrictions, to prevent them from being radicalized online as well as offline. His rule is totalitarian, state capitalist, socially conservative, and ultranationalistic; the PRC under his rule is said to be similar to fascism than communism, like Russia under Putin’s rule. Xi's traditionalist cultural policies were deeply influenced by Chiang Kai-shek's far-right New Life Movement; it is also commonly referred to as "Confucian fascism".

On top of that, Xi's party sought to further crush online dissent by "bringing in tougher controls of social media and instant messaging tools," specifically saying the party wants to "regulate the orderly dissemination of information." At a time when Chinese youth and dissidents are using the internet to circumvent the so-called Great Firewall, people using such avenues as microblogs (namely Weibo) which bypass government censorship and government control has repeatedly and reportedly given Beijing a cold sweat. The party wants to promote values consistent with what the party holds dear, and in a way to promote further nationalism, the party sees anything originating from Western media (such as Hollywood movies) as "encouraging dissent and grassroots activism." Xi used the death of a toddler, who was struck by a vehicle and left for dead by passersby, as another excuse to reignite national "soul-searching." On Weibo, the Chinese version of Twitter, pictures of a high-speed train crash that killed 40 people were posted everywhere, an embarrassment for the party which prides itself on efficient governance. News of the new social crackdown prompted Weibo users to publicly criticize the party, saying “How can a government say it represents you if it wants to control how many times a day you watch entertainment on TV?”

Xi's government also took aim at TV broadcasting, first by banning TV broadcasters from showing historical dramas deemed "too entertaining" and not patriotic enough, specifically citing period or idol dramas as "vulgar" entertainment. Programs dealing with "marital troubles and matchmaking, talent, game shows, talk shows and reality programming" are all seen as "vulgar TV" which the party "sees as unhealthy attention to celebrities and certain distracting activities." All those programs will be replaced by news channels and "cultural programming" that the party deems preferable to anything they find to be Western cultural influences. The order also "bans viewership surveys" and the use of ratings "as the sole criteria for whether to broadcast a particular show." Most bizarrely, the party decided to ban "effeminate men" from television broadcasting, as China TV regulators called for TV programs to "resolutely put an end to sissy men and other abnormal esthetics," because they are part of a celebrity culture that promotes "admiration of wealth and celebrity" in the eyes of the party. Young men who "display gentle personalities" and "act in boys’ love dramas" have amassed large fan bases mostly comprising women, a Chinese parallel to K-Pop stars in Korea, and many of them, like Xiao Zhan and Wang Yibo, are China’s top-earning celebrities. There is inside the Chinese government a large strain of politicians that disparages and ridicules nontraditional men, gender-neutral aesthetics, and see femininity as a weakness unbecoming of a "real" man. There is also a very eerie parallel to homophobic segments in Western society, as the Ministry of Education pledged to promote sports education in response to a Chinese party lawmaker wanting to "prevent men from becoming too feminine." Days before the order was issued, a commentary published by a Communist Party mouthpiece called the popularity of "sissy pants" a "social problem" that would "distort the taste of the Chinese youth."

China under the Xi Jinping administration has a cultural imperialist attitude toward Korea based on Chinese nationalism. China excessively censors Korean culture, but Chinese culture has been indiscriminately introduced into South Korea, sparking controversy over cultural invasion. China has a colonialist attitude toward North Korea, with even its official ally North Korean leader Kim Jong-un fearing that their country might become like Tibet or Xinjiang.

As explained by queer Chinese, masculinity is associated with nationalism and the party believes "the effeminate male image could mislead young people, hinder the nation’s rejuvenation, and weaken the country’s ability in fighting with others." By reinforcing gender norms, Xi and his party feel they are resisting Western gender values, which is why "sissy pants" and "sissy boys" are ridiculed by the party. Many feminist Chinese women balked at the implication that traits associated with women are inferior. Official rejection of "sissy men," Weibo users fear, will "encourage the kind of toxic masculinity that leads to violence against women, sexual minorities as well as men who do not fit into the traditional macho image." This is also in response to young Chinese embracing gender-neutral entertainment figures as a way to challenge the party's culture of toxic masculinity. Even explicitly homosexual characters are not allowed on Chinese television. Platforms have previously "blurred male stars’ earrings and ponytails" because of their "ostensible association with rebellion and counterculture."

Anti LGBT crackdowns

Xi and his party have also shown their progressive views with their ideology of masculine projection, seeing gay and trans people as threatening the vision of manhood, and justifying his crackdowns (mirroring Putin’s and Russia's anti-LGBT policies).

Ethnic cleansing

See the main articles on this topic: Uighur genocide and Ethnic cleansing

In response to the Urumqi Riots of 2009 and a series of terrorist attacks carried out by advocates for Xinjiang's independence against Han Chinese within the last decade, Uyghurs (a predominantly Muslim ethnic group that mostly lives in Xinjiang Province) have been forced into reeducation camps to indoctrinate them with the CCP's party line. In 2019, it was discovered that China has been systematically razing mosques, Islamic cemeteries and other religious sites from Xinjiang Province. The forced Sinicization of Uyghurs, indoctrination, and razing of religious sites amounts to ethnic cleansing.

The re-education camps, cooperative surveillance systems, and widespread policing and general profiling that is seen in Xinjiang were first developed and implemented in Tibet. The current Party Secretary of Xinjiang, appointed by Xi Jinping himself, was formerly the Party Secretary of Tibet, Chen Quanguo (who headed the ethnic cleansing program and indoctrination in Tibet).

Chinese Dream

As a way to encapsulate his ideology (and corresponding administrative policy) to the public, Xi announced — and continues to promote — the so-called "Chinese Dream" (中国梦). While he did not create the term, he popularized the phrase to such an extent that "Chinese Dream" has become an integral part of Chinese social lingo and common thought.

There's a lot of intrigue about the idea of what the Chinese Dream really is. Xi champions it as "rejuvenation, improvement of people’s livelihoods, prosperity, construction of a better society and military strengthening." Others say it's related to sustainable development (like tackling pollution or providing food safety). A more skeptical view is that Xi is using the Chinese Dream to reclaim public support for the party in a time where people are very much aware that it's not all sunshine and rainbows with the government, in order to drum up a sense of nationalism within the populace as the state of China attempts to compete with the US for influence.

While individualistic (Xi himself had "seen the American Dream up close" while touring New York), it's still about collectivism, as a successful individual is the first step towards a prosperous community (at least, in the eyes of the CCP). In particular, it emphasizes the Zhonghua minzu ("Chinese nation" or "Chinese ethnicity"), China's unique ethno-nationalist identity that unites various ethnic groups existing in Chinese territory. This is quite different from the "American Dream" for all immigrants across ethnic groups and races. In other words, the American dream is a [classical] liberal concept related to 'immigration', while the Chinese dream is a nationalist concept related to the 'native'.

A large part of this is due to how the Chinese middle class, which barely existed a decade before Xi came to power, has grown exponentially over the past 30 years. On the flip side, this has led to rising wages, making it more difficult for China to carry on with its export-oriented economy and to continue its miraculous economic growth.

Xi has also a strong, very well-known aversion to any social spending, endorsing a live-to-work philosophy. In 2021, he deried the the strong social security that exists in some countries of Latin America as "welfarism", claiming that these policies made the people of the region "lazy". During the Covid-19 pandemic, when the US government spent trillions to help consumers, China went for trickle-down economics instead. According to Xi, even the fact that China is now a middle-income country, and can afford some social security for the poor, is not enough reason to build a stronger welfare state, arguing that it would create a "idleness-breeding trap".

Belt and Road Initiative

Beyond just cultural posturing and rhetorical pomp (see Chinese Dream above), Xi does have a vision for the future of his country, and it's a vision where China overtakes the United States as the world's superpower. In 2013, he announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), sometimes called the New Silk Road, which is perhaps the most ambitious global infrastructure plan in history. With the goal of expanding Chinese soft power and turning more countries away from the United States, the BRI consists of six urban development land corridors linked by road, rail, energy, ports, and digital infrastructure. It is a centerpiece of Xi's foreign policy, and many critics argue that the BRI is a "debt" trap for many countries. Those roads are paved by the Chinese, those bridges are owned by the Chinese, that debt is owed to the Chinese, and many feel like the BRI is little more than soft imperialism at work on the part of Beijing. "Belt" refers to the proposed overland routes for road and rail transportation through landlocked Central Asia along the famed historical trade routes of the Western Regions; "road" refers to the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road – the Indo-Pacific sea routes through Southeast Asia to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. With nearly 2000 projects in development as of 2019, the BRI is slated to finish by 2049, the 100-year anniversary of the People's Republic of China. One such negative consequence of the BRI is its effect on Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. The Chinese government is interested in expanding the BRI to Xinjiang, which would allow for the Sinofication of the region and the further cultural elimination of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang, which itself means "frontier" in Mandarin. China has already invested billions of dollars in several South Asian countries like Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Afghanistan to improve their basic infrastructure, utilizing "digital projects, cultural exchange, and educational initiatives" to "project influence" while maintaining "strategic ambiguity" in regions like the Gulf.

Environmental impact

Approximately 54% of the BRI's energy projects are in clean energy or alternative energy sectors. But the BRI poses significant risks to the environment nonetheless, particularly overuse of natural resources, the disruption of ecosystems, and the continued (and in some cases increased) emission of pollutants. Coal-fired power stations, such as Emba Hunutlu power station in Turkey, are being built as part of BRI, thus increasing greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. Many critics even within China's sphere of influence have noted several problems, particularly during the BRI's first decade of operation: glacier melting as a result of excess greenhouse gas emissions, endangered species preservation, desertification and soil erosion as a result of overgrazing and over farming, mining practices, water resource management, and air and water pollution as a result of poorly planned infrastructure projects are some of the ongoing concerns as they relate to Central Asian nation. In Serbia, for instance, where pollution-related deaths already top Europe, the presence of Chinese-owned coal-powered plants have resulted in an augmentation in the country's dependency on coal, as well as air and soil pollution in some towns.

Clean energy revolution

But we will give credit where it's due. The BRI has allowed China to become the world's leader in electric vehicle production and distribution, even surpassing the United States by a wide margin. China now holds over three-quarters of the world’s battery production capacity. The battery is among the most important components of an EV and accounts for 40 percent of the vehicle’s total price. Moreover, China houses more than half of the world’s processing and refining capacity for lithium, cobalt, and graphite, "which are essential materials for making EV batteries." Specifically, China "boasts 70 percent of the global production capacity for cathodes and 85 percent for anodes." Decarbonization has become a major goal for the BRI since the 2020s.

Here's a sense of scale. In 2000, the state of Chinese R&D on lithium ion batteries (LIBs) and electric drive systems was "about 10 years behind Japan, "considering both technology performance and cost. Over the next five years, China closed this gap to less than two years, "primarily due to the 863 Program," the nation’s rise in consumer electronics, and the "emergence of BYD Company Ltd.," a "successful battery maker for consumer products" that entered the auto sector as a privately owned company in 2003. They achieved this in four ways: first, Xi's government "requested" foreign automakers working in joint ventures with Chinese automakers to share their PEV technology with the Chinese companies. Second, the central government, as well as provincial and city governments, made subsidies available only to companies assembling vehicles in China, which favored Chinese automakers. Third, Chinese automakers had to use an approved Chinese supplier of LIBs to qualify for PEV subsidies. Japanese and Korean battery producers, even though they were investing in Chinese facilities, were "effectively excluded from the Chinese market for several years." Finally, Chinese banks helped Chinese suppliers gain access to raw materials for producing LIBs and electric motors. China possesses some, but not all, of those key raw materials (e.g., lithium, cobalt, and neodymium), which limited their capacity at first; this was a major reason why they were so far behind their competitors by the 21st Century. How did they change this? Chinese banks, working closely with the central government, enabled Chinese suppliers to acquire ownership interests in mines and processing facilities in Africa, Australia, Europe, North America, and South America. China has thus "developed a vast network of influence over the most challenging links in the PEV supply chain, a distinctive advantage over lagging American and European competitors."

At a time when Donald Trump is actively destroying the green energy industry in America, China under Xi has invested $47 billion in solar panel manufacturing, leads the world in the construction of nuclear power plants, and sells more electric vehicles than the rest of the world combined. According to the IEA, China now has "one-third of the world’s wind power, four of the top ten wind-turbine makers, six of the top ten solar-panel manufacturers, and a quarter of the world’s solar capacity." Even the US-based Brookings Institution reported that China could generate 80 percent of its energy from renewables by 2050, becoming the world's first clean energy superpower.

Corruption and organized crime

Scholars have recognized an increase in Chinese organized crime syndicate activity in some BRI countries. Their activities include online fraud (including pyramid schemes), online gambling, human trafficking (for slavery and prostitution), animal or animal parts trafficking (for use in traditional Chinese medicine), and money laundering (of the proceeds of crime from the PRC). The most notable locations are Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and the Philippines, all of which have sizable Chinese populations in their own right. The BRI inadvertently turned Chinese crime syndicates into a regional problem which they're still dealing with to this day. The People’s Bank of China itself even estimated that as much as CNY 1 trillion (a staggering $150 billion) in illicit proceeds flows out of China annually due to illegal betting. Per the Ministry of Public Security, Chinese police "investigated 17,000 cross-border gambling and related cases, arrested 110,000 suspects, and took action against 3,400 online gambling platforms and over 2,800 illegal payment platforms and underground banks." A 2021 analysis by AidData at the College of William & Mary found that Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Belarus were the top countries for reported corruption scandals involving BRI projects, with many public officials either getting caught for money laundering or take outright bribes to fund local pet projects.

Labour abuses and human rights violations

According to a report by American NGO China Labor Watch, there are "widespread human rights violations" concerning Chinese migrant workers sent abroad. The Chinese companies allegedly "commit forced labor" and usually "confiscate the workers' passports" once they arrive in another country, make them apply for illegal business visas and "threaten to report their illegal status if they refuse to comply," refuse to give adequate medical care and rest, restrict workers' personal freedom and freedom of speech, force workers to overwork, cancel vacations, delay the payment of wages, publish deceptive advertisements and promises, browbeat workers with high amount of damages if they intend to leave, provide bad working and living conditions, punish workers who lead protests and so on.

Made in China 2025

As for domestic issues, Xi unveiled the "Made in China 2025" program meant to develop China's manufacturing sector. Unveiled in 2017, China aims to move away from being the "world's factory," meaning a producer of cheap low-tech goods facilitated by lower labour costs. The industrial policy aims to "upgrade the manufacturing capabilities of Chinese industries," growing from labor-intensive workshops into "a more technology-intensive" powerhouse. To help achieve independence from foreign suppliers, the initiative encourages increased production in high-tech products and services, with its semiconductor industry central to the industrial plan, partly because advances in chip technology may "lead to breakthroughs in other areas of technology, handing the advantage to whoever has the best chips – an advantage that currently is out of Beijing’s reach." Industries integral to MIC 2025 include aerospace, biotech, information technology, smart manufacturing, maritime engineering, advanced rail, electric vehicles, electrical equipment, new materials, biomedicine, agricultural machinery and equipment, pharmaceuticals, and robotics manufacturing, many of which have been dominated by foreign companies. Predictably, the Americans consider this a threat to their status as the world's leading technological hub, but ironically, every time the Americans have tried to impede, obstruct, or stall Xi's tech policy, they've only served to increase global support for Made in China 2025, especially after Donald Trump implemented tariffs worldwide.